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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30) and (31)
(1986), formerly Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(21) and (22), the
providing of one-way paging service to the general public fails
to constitute the service of a "public utility," and is, therefore, not subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission of Utah ("PSCU").
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The determinative statutory provisions necessary to a final
resolution of the present appeal are:

Utah Code Ann.

§ 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986), a copy of which is attached as
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves the PSCU's lack of statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging services for the reason that one-way
paging service is not a public utility.

This case is before

the Court on appeal as of right brought by defendant and appellant American Paging, Inc. (of Utah) ("American Paging") from
an Order and Declaratory Judgment in favor of plaintiffs and
respondents, David R. Williams d/b/a Industrial Communications
("Industrial") and Mobile Telephone, Inc. ("Mobile").

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September 1983, American Paging began to offer one-way
paging service in Utah after receiving a letter from the PSCU,
stating that it was not necessary for American Paging to file
an application for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity because American Paging proposed to offer only such
services and the PSCU did not deem itself as having jurisdiction over such paging services.

(R. at 28-29.)

On November 28, 1983, after a full hearing and complete
consideration of the jurisdictional issue, the PSCU formally
held that it lacks statutory jurisdiction over the one-way
paging services of American Paging in a proceeding involving a
complaint filed by Industrial against American Paging and an
Order to Show Cause filed by the Division of Public Utilities.
(R. at 194.)

See Order in PSCU Case No. 83-044-03, attached as

Addendum B.
Also, on November 28, 1983, the PSCU dismissed an application of Page America of Utah, Inc., which had been filed
seeking a certificate of authority from the PSCU to furnish
one-way paging service, based upon its determination that it
lacks jurisdiction over one-way paging services.
196-210.)

(R. at

See In the Matter of Page America of Utah, Inc.,

Order on Motion for Exempt Certificate, PSCU Case No.
83-082-01, attached as Addendum C.
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Industrial then appealed the Page America Order to the Utah
Supreme Court.

On appeal, this Court addressed the procedural

issues raised and concluded that the PSCU was required to once
again review the matter by following the requirements of the
Utah Administrative Rule-making Act.

See Williams v. Public

Service Commission of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), attached
as Addendum D.
Following the issuance of the Williams v. Public Service
Commission of Utah decision, Industrial and Mobile filed
actions against American Paging in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, claiming monetary damages based on
the alleged unlawful performance of paging services in Utah by
American Paging under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-7-22 (1953 as amended).

American Paging filed a motion to

dismiss the complaints, and Industrial and Mobile filed motions
for partial summary judgment.

Following oral arguments on the

motions, Judge Hanson denied both motions, but entered his
Order and Declaratory Judgment, indicating that, based upon his
interpretation of this Court's decision in Williams v. Public
Service Commission of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), the
providing of one-way paging services to the general public does
constitute the service of a public utility which is subject to
the regulatory jurisdiction of the PSCU.

Judge Hanson then

also granted the parties' request for certification of final
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judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Copies of the Order and Declaratory Judgment are

attached as Addendum E.

(R. at 249-258.)

On April 15, 1986, the PSCU filed a Notice of Proposed Rule
with the Office of Administrative Rules, which stated that the
PSCU lacks jurisdiction over one-way paging.

After further com-

pliance with the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act's requirements and procedures, the PSCU, on May 16, 1986, restated its
former jurisdictional determination in formal PSCU Rule No.
8304, concluding that "[t]he Public Service Commission of Utah
does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging services. . . ."
(R. at 30.)

A copy of the Rule is attached as Addendum F.

In order to further clarify the PSCU's jurisdiction as it
might have been altered by the legislative enactment of the
Public Telecommunications Utilities Act in 1985, Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-8b-l, e_t seq. , American Paging submitted an application to
the PSCU seeking a certificate of public convenience and
necessity to operate as a public utility in the State of Utah
and simultaneously moved to dismiss its own application based
on the jurisdictional grounds.

On May 23, 1986, the PSCU in

Case No. 85-2007-01 entered its Order granting American
Paging1s motion to dismiss its own application upon the grounds
that the PSCU has no jurisdiction to regulate American Paging1s
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one-way paging services.

(R. at 30-31.)*

A copy of the Order

is attached as Addendum G.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The PSCU lacks statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging
services because such services do not constitute those of a
public utility. Therefore, operation of one-way paging services
cannot form the basis of an action for damages under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-22 for the following reasons:
(1) one-way paging does not fall within the Public Utilities
Act, Chapter 2 definitions of public utilities services which
are subject to PSCU regulatory jurisdiction; (2) the great
weight of case authority demonstrates that one-way paging
systems are not public utility services and are not subject to
PSCU statutory jurisdiction under relevant Utah statutes;
(3) this Court did not address the issue of statutory
jurisdiction over one-way paging in its Williams decision; and
(4) a history of infrequent interpretive regulation or unwitting PSCU accession to requests for certificates of authority

The validity of PSCU Rule 8304 and the PSCU's subsequent
Order of Dismissal of American Paging's application are the
subject of review by this Court sought by Industrial, in
Supreme Court Consolidated Case Nos. 860313 and 860314. All
parties to these cases as well as the instant case have stipulated to the consolidation of those cases with the instant case
for the purpose of this Court's review.
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cannot create or confer statutory jurisdiction in violation of
legislative enactments.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AMERICAN PAGING'S SERVICE IS NOT ENCOMPASSED
BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-2-1 (1986), AND
CANNOT FORM THE BASIS FOR AN ACTION FOR
DAMAGES UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-7-22
(1986).
In Utah, the standard for stating a jurisdictionally sound
claim against any entity under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-22 (1986)
is not met unless the entity is a public utility.
The alleged jurisdictional basis for Industrial and
Mobile's claim against American Paging is found in the following statutory language:
In case any public utility shall do or cause or permit
to be done any act, matter or thing prohibited, forbidden or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do
any act, matter or thing required to be done either by
the Constitution or any law of this state or by any
order or decision of the Commission, such public utility shall be liable to the persons affected thereby
for all losses, damages or injury caused thereby or
resulting therefrom . . . . (Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-22 (1986).

According to the language of

Section 22, a defendant is not liable for plaintiff's alleged
damage, loss, or injury unless the defendant is a public
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utility under the definitions set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-2-1 (1986).
Thus, the dispositive issue in this case is whether or not
one-way paging services constitute a legislatively defined
public utility, subject to PSCU regulatory jurisdiction.

No

case law or statutory authority supports Industrial and
Mobile's contention that American Paging*s one-way paging
service is a public utility under the Utah Public Utilities
Act, or that American Paging's service falls within the
regulatory jurisdiction of the PSCU.
A.

PSCU Statutory Jurisdiction Over Public Utilities Must
Be Strictly Construed.

The Public Utilities Act, Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (1986),
vests authority in the commission to regulate only public
utilities.

See also Public Utility Commission v. Garvloch, 54

Utah 406, 181 P. 272, 276 (1919).

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1

enumerates the utilities which are subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction and regulation.

The relevant provision of the Act

for the purposes of this appeal is section 54-2-1(30) and (31)
which gives the PSCU regulatory jurisdiction over "telephone
corporations," which are defined as "every corporation and
person . . . owning, controlling, operating, or managing any
telephone line for public service within this state. . . . "
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Id.

The PSCU's power of regulation is derivative.

The PSCU may

only regulate entities included within the statutory definitions of "public utility," specifically telephone corporations
that utilize a telephone line.

Because the statutory delega-

tion of authority under subsections (30) and (31) involves
imposition of regulatory burdens, statutory jurisdiction over
such telephone corporations must be strictly construed.

Basin

Flying Service v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 531 P.2d
1303 (Utah 1975) .
This Court upholds strict construction of public utility
definitions to the extent that "restraints or duties imposed by
law must be clear and unequivocal."

Id.,

at 1305.

In Basin

Flying Service, this Court specifically declared that:
[I]t is well established that a regulatory body such
as the Public Service Commission, which is created by
and derives its powers and duties from statute, has no
inherent regulatory powers, but only those which are
expressly granted, or which are clearly implied as
necessary to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it.
Id.

See also Public Service Commission of Wyoming v. Formal

Complaint of WNZ Co., 641 P.2d 183, 186 (Wyo. 1982) (holding
that "[T]he statutes creating and empowering the PSC must be
strictly construed and any reasonable doubt of the existence of
any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof.")

-8-

Importantly, this Court has never acknowledged statutory
jurisdiction or upheld PSCU assertion of regulatory power over
commercial one-way paging under the provisions of Chapter 2 of
the Public Utilities Act.

Indeed, in Medic-Call, Inc. v.

Public Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 P.2d 258,
260-261 (1970), this Court stated that it:
did not reach the issue of whether a publicly available paging service, . . . would be a public utility
because [its] holding was limited to the private
nature of arrangements before [it].
Nevertheless, the clear majority of other jurisdictions that
have addressed this specific issue have held that one-way
paging services do not constitute public utility services and
thus, should not be subject to commission regulation.
Annot. 44 A.L.R. 4th 216, 220-222 (1986).

See

For a complete

discussion of relevant case authorities, see American Paging's
Brief in Supreme Court Consolidated Case Nos. 860313 and
860314, Points 1(A) and (B).
B.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 Excludes One-Way Paging From
Its Scope of Regulation.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(31) (1986) defines a telephone line
as follows:
[A]11 conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments and appliances, and all other real estate and
fixtures and personal property owned, controlled,
operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone whether such communication is had with or without the use of transmission
wires. (Emphasis added.)
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If one-way paging systems do not utilize a telephone line "in
connection with or to facilitate communications by telephone,"
they are neither telephone corporations nor public utilities
subject to PSCU regulation.
Utah law and principles of statutory construction demand
that statutes be read according to their plain meaning so as to
avoid absurd results.

Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575

P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978).

Applying this plain meaning and

strict construction principle, the PSCU excluded one-way paging
services from the statutory definition of telephone corporation.
In interpreting the key definition of "telephone line" in
the Page America Order, the Commission stated the several
characteristics which distinguish one-way paging services from
what constitutes a public utility under section 54-2-1.

One of

the most compelling justifications for excluding one-way paging
from regulation as a telephone corporation is stated by the
PSCU as follows:
The distinction between paging and telephone
service is critical because if in defining "telephone
line" one focuses on the phrase "facilitate telephone
communication," the scope of potentially regulated
services becomes staggering. Conceivably the Commission should then regulate all suppliers of telephone
equipment, e.g. Radio Shack, Sears, J. C. Penney,
Panasonic; suppliers of wiring components; all suppliers of telephone directories, including the many
not affiliated with the Bell system; telephone answering services, telephone answering devices and all such
suppliers; radio talk stations; newspaper classified
advertising, _ad absurdum. The focus instead should be
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on the connotation of telephone service which implies
interactive, and at least potentially extended two-way
communication. That was certainly the focus in 1917
when the statute was enacted, since most of the services now technologically feasible were not foreseen
at that time. Paging service is conceptually no
different from answering services (which have never
been considered appropriate objects of state regulation); it is the same service offered through a
different medium. Telephone service over land lines
or radio waves is fundamentally the same service
irrespective of the means of transmission. But telephone service is a two-way service; paging service is
one-way call notification.
In the Matter of Page America of Utah, Inc., Order on Motion
for Exempt Certificate, PSCU Case No. 83-082-01 at 11.
The exclusion of one-way paging services from public
utility regulation is the correct interpretation of Utah Code
Ann. § 54-2-1(30) and (31). First, the statute calls for use
of telephone equipment "in connection with or to facilitate
communication by telephone," which contemplates two-way interactive communication, not just message transmission.

Second,

one-way paging does not under any description constitute twoway interactive communication achieved by using equipment "in
connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone."
To include one-way paging within the statutory definition of
telephone corporations which utilize a telephone line would
result in an absurd overextension of statutory jurisdiction in
violation of this Court's mandates.
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Curtis, 575 P.2d at 1046.

The one-way paging process is accomplished by simply storing a message with a service, which either notifies the paging
customer that the message is waiting, or sends the message
directly to the customer.

In either case, the customer cannot

interactively communicate with the caller as with "communication by telephone," as required by statute to be regulated as a
public utility.
The PSCU therefore adopted a reasonable definition of the
terms "in connection with" and "facilitate" as used in the
statute.

A broad and unchecked definition of such terms could

lead to unintended and absurd results.

The absurdity of a

broad definition of the term "facilitate" is noted in Illinois
Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 4 4 7
N.E.2d 295, 298 (111. 1983), as follows:
The Commission points out that the publishers of telephone classified directors, such as legal or medical
directories also facilitate telephone communication,
but it could hardly be said that those publishers were
intended by the legislature to be considered public
utilities. Similarly it could be said that simple
answering services aid and facilitate telephone
communication. But it is obvious that the nature of
the service is not a functional part of the transmission of message by telephone, nor is radio paging.
It is submitted that the term "facilitate" as used in the
Utah statute is viewed with common sense and applied only to
that equipment and property used directly in the transmission
of a two-way telephone communication.
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Otherwise, no reasonable

limit to PSCU regulatory function in connection with telephone
service can be attained.
C.

Case Authority Demonstrates That One-Way Paging Is Not
A Public Utility Service And Is Not Subject To PSCU
Statutory Jurisdiction.

American Paging has fully discussed the weight of authority
denouncing state regulation of one-way paging services in its
brief filed in Supreme Court Consolidated Case Nos. 860313 and
860314 at Point 1(A) and (B).
For the reasons stated herein and in the previous American
Paging brief, the majority of jurisdictions interpreting Public
Utility Acts similar to the Utah Act have excluded one-way
paging services from public utility regulation.

See In Re

Cincinnati Radiotelephone Systems, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 826 (Ohio
1976) (holding that one-way paging is neither "a telephone
company" nor a "public utility."); Illinois Consolidated
Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 447 N.E.2d 295
(111. 1983) (holding that because one-way paging cannot be used
for two-way communications, it cannot be regulated as a utility
used "for or in connection with . . . the transmission of telegraph or telephone messages."); In Re Answerphone of Kansas
City, Inc., 87 P.U.R.3d 164 (Mo. PSC 1970); Radio Telephone
Communications, Inc. v. Southeastern Telephone, 170 S.2d 577
(Fla. 1964); Appeal of Omni- Communications, Inc., 451 A.2d
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1289 (N.H. 1982) (holding that the Public Utilities Commission
had no authority to regulate radio pagers and any such regulation constitutes "interference and disruption of free market
private enterprise."); and Ram Broadcasting v. Michigan Public
Service Commission, 317 N.W.2d 295 (Mich. App. 1982) (holding
one-way radio pagers not within the scope of the Public Service
Commission's jurisdiction over public utilities.)
POINT II
THIS COURT'S WILLIAMS V. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH DECISION DID NOT ADDRESS THE
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE OF PSCU STATUTORY JURISDICTION OVER ONE-WAY PAGING PURSUANT TO UTAH
CODE ANN. § 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986).
In the court below, Industrial and Mobile contended that
this Court's recent decision in Williams v. Public Service
Commission of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986) addressed and
decided the substantive issue of PSCU statutory jurisdiction
over one-way paging services.

This Court's recent Williams

decision is, however, completely devoid of any discussion
relative to the scope of regulatory power legislatively granted
to the PSCU by Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30) and (31).

Impor-

tantly, this Court's only discussion of the issue of statutory
jurisdiction over one-way paging was made in the Medic-Call
decision.

In the Medic-Call case, this Court held that one-way

-14-

paging service, operated in the private sector by physicians,
is not a public utility service and cannot be regulated by
PSCU.

Additionally, in addressing the status of one-way paging

as a public utility, this Court stated:
The service [one-way paging] is comparable to that
which would be rendered by runners or call boys to
notify doctors that they were wanted on the phone.
One wonders just how the defendant would go about
regulating the service even if it had the power to do
so.
If defendants can regulate the service rendered by
plaintiffs herein, could they not with equal propriety
regulate the semaphore signaling of the boy scouts or
the smoke signals of the Indians on a hunting expedition?
Medic-Call, 470 P.2d at 260.
In Williams, this Court noted that in the prior case of
Medic-Call it "did not reach the issue of whether publicly
available paging service . . . would be a public
utility. . . ."

Williams, 720 P.2d 777, n.9.

It was not until

1983, that the PSCU determined that it has no statutory
jurisdiction over commercial one-way paging services.

Up to

that time, neither the PSCU nor this Court had addressed the
specific issue of whether the PSCU lacked statutory jurisdiction over commercial one-way paging.
Furthermore, nowhere in the Williams opinion did this Court
state that one-way paging is a public utility service under the
definitions then contained in the Public Utilities Act nor did

-15-

this Court indicate that it was deciding anything but the
procedural rulemaking issue before it.

Therefore, any other

commentary in the Williams opinion concerning unwitting grants
of certificates of authority is not determinative of the issue
of the legislative grant of jurisdiction of the PSCU.
In Williams, this Court addressed only the procedural question presented to it and left the statutory jurisdiction determination to the PSCU, to be resolved in a later rulemaking
proceeding pursuant to the expertise of the PSCU.

This Court

stated:
the jurisdictional issue [PSCU jurisdiction over oneway paging] likely will be resolved by a rulemaking
proceeding on remand and will obviate the need for
future proceedings . . . .
(Emphasis added).
Williams, 720 P.2d at 777.

The PSCU complied with the Supreme

Court's directive and again determined that it lacks jurisdiction over one-way paging services through a proper rulemaking
procedure.

See Addenda F and G.
POINT III

PRIOR INTERPRETIVE OR INADVERTENT REGULATION
OF ONE-WAY PAGING DOES NOT CONFER STATUTORY
JURISDICTION ON THE PSCU.
In the court below, Industrial argued that the PSCU's
history of regulation creates jurisdiction over one-way
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paging.

Industrial cited Husky Oil Co. of Delaware v. State

Tax Commission of Utah, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976) as authority
for the proposition that prior regulation of one-way paging
somehow creates statutory jurisdiction to regulate non-public
utilities and further prevents departure from such inadvertent
and improper "interpretive regulation."
cannot prevail.

Such an argument

Otherwise, the Commission could endow itself

with authority which the legislature never intended through its
own sporadic and unwitting grants of certificates of authority.
Respondents seriously misconstrue the distinction between
"regulation" and "statutory jurisdiction."

Respondents mis-

takenly assume that an administrative agency's improper or
unwitting assertion of regulation alters a legislative grant of
authority and, thus, brings the non-regulated activity within
the Utah Legislature's definition of public utilities.
Respondents' assumption and argument are both (A) contrary
to Utah law, and (B) inconsistent with and not applicable to
the critical facts in the instant case.
A.

Prior PSCU Regulation Does Not Confer Statutory
Jurisdiction.

This Court upholds the principle of law that an administrative interpretation out of harmony with and contrary to express
provisions of statutes interpreted cannot be given weight
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because administrative construction may not be substituted for
legislation.

Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah

24, 151 P.2d 467, 470-73 (1944); Basin Flying Service v. Public
Service Commission, 531 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1975).
In Utah Hotel, this Court stated that:
Where an interpretive regulation is involved, the
ultimate question before the court is: What does the
statute mean?. . . Interpretive regulations . . .
have validity in judicial proceedings only to the
extent that they correctly construe the statute and
then, strictly speaking, it is the statute and not the
regulation to which the individual [or entity] must
conform. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 472. Hence, even though there existed improper accession to regulation of one-way paging, such regulation cannot
alter PSCU statutory jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-2-1(30) and (31), which excludes one-way paging from
public utility regulation.
This Court further stated that prior improper regulation
pursuant to a faulty interpretation does not have the effect of
changing statutory powers.

This Court declared the unwitting

or improper interpretation of a statute:
was purely a question of law and the erroneous interpretation of the statute by the Commission could not
have the effect of changing liability under the
statute nor of estopping the Commission from later
changing its interpretation.
Id. at 470.
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In the instant case, the PSCU never considered the interpretation of the definition of "telephone line" as applied to
paging until 1983.

It simply granted applications for certif-

icates of convenience and necessity to render paging service,
with but one exception, in conjunction with two-way mobile
telephone service.

The PSCU did not ever fully consider the

extent of its statutory jurisdiction until 1983.
The Husky decision relied upon by respondents has no application to the instant appeal for several reasons:
First, the Husky decision concerned a radical departure
from a formal and specific administrative rule upon which the
public had relied and which was consistently followed.

In the

instant case, there can be no such radical department from an
administrative rule because the PSCU never formally ruled that
it has jurisdiction over one-way paging services.
Second, in the Husky case, the State Tax Commission had
actually promulgated and followed formal Regulation S-38 in
1937, exempting certain sales transactions from taxation.
Later in 1971, the State Tax Commission contradicted the
statute by deleting the exemption from the regulation and added
language making the previously exempted transactions taxable.
Husky, 556 P.2d at 1270.

In the instant case, the PSCU's rule

excluding one-way paging from regulation is consistent with the
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relevant statutes and corrects a previous inadvertant regulatory oversight.
Finally, two Utah Supreme Court decisions had acknowledged
the validity of the 1937 S-38 exemption regulation in Husky and
its impact on relevant statutes.

The departure from a prior

administrative rule in Husky not only violated the relevant
statute, but it also was contrary to Utah law.

Id..

In con-

trast, this Court has never addressed the issue of statutory
jurisdiction over commercially offered one-way paging.
B.

Respondents' Arguments Are Not Applicable To The Facts
In The Instant Case.

The facts demonstrate that only one single certificate
granting authority to operate a one-way paging service has ever
been granted by the PSCU.
sion, 720 P.2d at 774.

Williams v. Public Service Commis-

Any other certificates were granted

only in connection with mobile telephone services, clearly
within the section 54-2-1 definition of public utilities.

When

the experience and expertise of the PSCU was actually focused
on the issue of statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging in a
full hearing in the adversarial context, the PSCU decided that
it did not have jurisdiction over one-way paging.
The PSCU further concluded that:
In construing its jurisdiction as a matter of first
impression . . . [W]e are persuaded by our review of
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Utah cases that the Utah Supreme Court has never
squarely addressed the Commission's jurisdiction over
paging services.
* * * * *

We further conclude that the inclusion of paging
service in any certificate issued by the Commission,
authorizing the holders to provide mobile telephone
service, was error. . . .
Id.
In the instant case, unlike Utah Hotel, the Tax Commission
never interpreted the jurisdictional statutes until the present
controversy arose in 1983.

Unlike the Husky Oil decision, the

PSCU's most recent interpretation of statutory jurisdiction
conforms to and is consistent with statutory authority.

There-

fore, a correct construction of the governing statutory provisions convincingly demonstrates that one-way paging services
are not those of a public utility and should not be subject to
PSCU regulation.
The fact that the PSCU may have mistakenly and inadvertently acceded to the regulation of paging services for several
years cannot alter the legislative grant of authority to the
PSCU under Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30) and (31) which excludes
one-way paging from regulation.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Order and Declaratory
Judgment of the district court should be reversed for the
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reason that the PSCU does not have statutory jurisdiction over
one-way paging.

The district court should be directed to

dismiss Industrial and Mobile's claims for damages for the
reason that American Paging is not a public utility.
DATED this

\z ~ day of December, 1986.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

-By-

^x U^oe^^n ^—^
Stuart^. Poelman
Larry R. Laycock
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant American Paging,
Inc. (of Utah)
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ADDENDUM A
Utah Code Ann., § 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986).
Public Utilities Definitions:
When used in this title:
•

*

*

*

(30) "Telephone corporation11 includes every
corporation and person, their lessees, trustees,
and receivers, owning, controlling, operating,
or managing any telephone line for public service within this state, provided, however, that
all corporations, partnerships, or firms providing intrastate cellular telephone service
shall cease to be "telephone corporations" nine
months after both the wire-line and the nonwireline cellular service providers have been issued
covering licenses by the Federal Communications
Commission. It does not include any person
which provides, on a resale basis, any telephone
or telecommunication service which is purchased
from a telephone corporation.
(31) "Telephone line" includes all conduits,
ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and
applicances, and all other real estate, fixtures,
and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone whether that communication is had with or without the use of
transmission wires.

ADDENDUM B
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Complaint
of DAVID R. WILLIAMS, dba
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS
Against American Paging of
Utah, Inc.

CASE NO. 83-044-03
ORDER

By the Commission:
Based

upon

the

Order

of

the

Commission

in

Case

No.

83-082-01, In the matter of the application of Page America of
Utah/ Inc. for a certificate of convenience and necessity as a
common carrier for furnishinq pagina service to areas within Salt
ii
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•
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•

i
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•
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•
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i
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Lake, Davis, and Tooele Countiesy Utah, in which the Commission
held that it lacked regulatory jurisdiction over one-way paging
service, the complaint herein is deemed moot, as is the Petition
for an Order to Show Cause filed by the Division of Public
Utilities, and both are therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
DATED at Salt Lake Cityf Utah, this 28th day of November,
1983.

/s/ Brent H. Cameron, Chairman
(SEAL)

/s/ David R. Irvine, Commissioner
/s/ James M. Byrne, Commissioner

Attest:
/s/ Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary

ADDENDUM C
• BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter cf the Application Of PAGE AMERICA OF*UTAH,
INC. for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity as a
Common Carrier for Furnishing
Paging Service to Areas Within
Salt Lake, Davis, Utah, and
Tooele Counties, Utan.

CASE NO. 83-082-01
ORDER ON MOTICM
r r c ^ T ~"" ~*
FOR EX-

Tr

Appearances:
Stephen R. Randle

For

Applicant

Stuart L. Poelman

n

American Paging cf Utah,
Inc., amicus curiae

Erintcn R. Burbidce

"

David R. Williams, dba
Industrial
Communicaticns,
Protestant

K. M. Lewis

"

Mcbile Telephone, Inc.,
Protestant

Richard Hinckley,
Assistant Attcrr.e;
General

"

Division of Public
Utilities, Department of
Business Regulation,
State cf Utah

By the Commission:
Applicant filed its application in this matter August 10,
1983.

Subsequent thereto, the question arose whether the Commis-

sion had

jurisdiction

to entertain

said

application, and the

Commission asked fcr briefs on the matter.

The parties thereaf-

ter asked for an evidentiary hearing for the purpose cf developing the record to describe the nature cf their respective business

operations

issue.

as

a basic

for

resolving

the

jurisdictional

Said hearing took place on November 7, 1983, at the hour

r--i

CASE "O. 83-082-01
- 2 of 2:00 p.m., before A. Robert Thurman, Administrative Law Judge
for the Commission.

Evidence was offered and received, and the

Administrative Law Judge, having considered the same, together
with the briefs submitted, new enters the following Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order based thereon.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Page America of Utah, Inc., hereafter called "Appli-

cant" is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the State of Utah, with its principal office at Salt Lake City,
Utah.

It is a subsidiary of Page America Group, Inc., a holding

company with operating companies
nationwide.
Paging,

Applicant's

Inc.,

appearing

in a large number of states

position
as

amicus

is

supported

curiae,

by

hereafter

American
called

"American," a corporation qualified to do business in the srate
of Utah, and which is already operating a paging service, though
without certification from this Commission.
opposed

by

David

R. Williams, cba

The application is

Industrial Communications,

hereafter called "Industrial", and by Mobile Telephone, Inc., a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of
Utah, hereafter called "MTI".

The Division of Public Utilities

also epposes the present motion of the Applicant for an exempt
certificate, and instead asks the Commission to exercise limited
regulatory oversight of paging service, similar to that which we
exercise over WATS resellers.
2.

Both of the protestants currently hold certificates of

convenience and necessity from this Commission authorizing them

CASE !IC, 83-082-01
- 3 to provide mobile radio-telephone service in various parts of the
state# and in conjunction therewith to operate paging service as
well.
and

The grants of authority have been made at various times,

with

a

single

exception

have

provided

for

operate both mobile telephone and paging service.

authority

to

In 1974, the

Commission issued a certificate to Mobile Telephone Service of
Southern Utah, Inc. (which corporation

is not a Protestant in

this case) in Case No. 6969 which dealt exclusively with the
provision of pacing service, and the Protestants cite that case
to

the

Commission

as

determinitive

that

the

already decided the jurisdictional issue herein.

Commission

has

In one case, to

be discussed hereafter, the Commission did assert jurisdiction
over such service, but that case was reversed by the Utah Supreme
Court, and in view of the Court's disposition of the same, we do
not consider ourselves bound by it.
ter, we do not believe

that

As we will discuss hereaf-

the Supreme Court

has

ruled in

respect to the Commission's jurisdiction over paging services.
3.

Paging technology has been developing extremely rapidly

over the past ten to fifteen years.
tially

the only method

pecple

Prior to that time, substan-

had

of

ensuring

that

they be

apprised of all calls when they were away from the phone, was to
employ an answering service.
message

with

the

answering

The calling party would leave a
service,

to

be

relayed

when

the

customer of the answering service phoned in to get the messages.
There was no way to let the customer know immediately when a
message had been left.

C-3
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The

"beeper".

first

electronic

improvement

was

a

tone-only

This was an electronic device which could be activated

by a radio signal from the answering service providing a highpitch tone to alert the customer that a message was waiting. The
most primitive form of this system involves a human activating
the beeper and giving the customer a message when the customer
phones in*

In almost all cases this primitive system has been

superseded by a machine which automatically activates the beeper
and then plays back the caller's message when the customer phones
in.
5.

The next advance in technology was to provide "tcne-tvo

address" service which would enable a customer, by the type of
the tone, to discern which of two numbers to call to get messages.

This type of service has in turn been superseded by "tone

and voice" service, which allows a person to hear the message
after the beeper is activated, thus sparing

the necessity of

phoning in to get messages.

Now on the horizon are two further

advances in the technology:

digital display (already available)

which will display the message in numeric form, obviously in most
cases directing the customer which telephone number to call tc
reach the caller.

Digital display is already available in many

parts of the country and has very recently been introduced in the
Salt Lake market.

It is likely to be superseded quite scon by an

"alpha-numeric" display which will enable the customer to receive
a short written message as well as numeric data.

C-4
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It is new

foreseeable

that

in

the near

future the

alpha-numeric display will enable the customer to use the services of a "network," which will link him to data bases, and will
enable him to use his service nationwide.

The Applicant and

American are each involved in establishing such a network.

Hone

of the existing certificated carriers in Utah have taken concrete
steps in such a direction.
7.

Despite the rapid advances in the technology, and the

potential for greater usefulness, the essential structure of the
service remains the same.

A caller uses the telephone system to

reach the service and leave a message.

The message is stored.

There is then a retransmission, either to alert the customer that
there is a message, or to send it directly for voice or display.
The retransmission may or may not involve use of the land lines.
The service requires, by way of equipment, some means of answering

the

calls,

storing

the messages,

transmitting

signal, and replaying the stored message.
must be done electronically
signal.

the

alert

The only part which

is the transmission of the alert

Obviously, a manual system for the other part of the

operation would be intolerably cumbersome, and hence automated
equipment to handle these aspects has been available for some
time.

Although this renders the establishment of such a system

expensive, nevertheless, if one compares the capital of such an
operation with that required for a land line telephone system, or
similar fixed utility, they are relatively modest.

Furthermore,

the operation of such a system does not involve the installation

CASE >:C. 8 3-032-01
- 6 and maintenance of a wide-spread, expensive physical distribution
system.
8.
located

The Federal
two primary

Communications
bands

Commission

for paging

service.

known as the "high band," lies around 900 MHz.
around 35 and 43 MKz.

(FCC) has alOne,

commonly

"Low bandH lies

The FCC has recently allocated 68 addi-

tional channels for the "high band" and 28 channels in the "low
band".

Between them, the two bands have had only eight channels

heretofore.

The

FCC

has

also

considerably

liberalized

its

criteria for granting new licenses on these bands.
9.

In the wake of the TCC allocation of additional chan-

nels i and relaxation of licensing requirements# there has been a
perceptible trend in a number of states toward relaxing regulation of paging services, or deregulating them altogether.
10.

At present, the Applicant's subsidiaries in a number of

other states are offering tone and voice paging, digital paging,
and in some cases alpha-numeric paging.

They prcpose to offer

all forms immediately, should they be granted authority, with the
possible exception of alpha-numeric, which may be delayed slightly for technical reasons.

They also propose to offer network

paging as soon as it is available.

American offers the same

present capabilities, and proposes the same future service.
presently offers all forms except alpha-numeric.

MTI

MTI has begun

investigating possible network affiliation, but has no concrete
plans at present.
and

voice.

It

Industrial can presently offer tone, and tone
has

the

technical
c-6

capabilities

of

offering

CASE NO. 93-082-01
- 7 digital, but at present has no frequencies available to it for
that purpose.

It expects they will be available, and it proposes

to offer such service as soon as it is possible.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The issue

turns upon the construction

of Utah Code

Annotated 54-2-1 (22) , which gives regulatory jurisdiction to the
Commission over telephone corporations as defined therein.

An

integral part of that definition incorporates a separate definition of a "telephone line" which U.C.A. 54-2-1 (21) defines to be
"all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables,
instruments and appliances, and all other
real estate and fixtures and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in
connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone whether such communication
is had with or without the use of transmission wires."
2.

Because

the Utah statute uses the terras "facilitate

communication by telephone whether such communication is had with
or without the use of transmission wires," it simply is not clear
that the Legislature

specifically

intended

to include one-way

paging service within the regulatory jurisdiction of this Commission.

In construing

its

jurisdiction

as

a matter

of

first

impression, the Commission first considers the plain meaning of
the underlying statute.

Where the statute is ambiguous, as here,

we examine the decisions of courts for guidance in construing the
law; and where reasonably direct guidance is lacking in authoritative case law, we endeavor to apply a prudent judgment grounded in our regulatory experience which takes into account the
C-7
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and economic bases

prises the unique

for affording

certain enter-

status of regulated monopolies, as well as

considerations of public interest in receiving necessary utility
service.

The parties in this matter have referred the Commission

to many cases from our own and other states, some of which have
opted for a regulatory plan for paging service, and some which
have not.

The weight of case authority is split, and we are

persuaded by our review of Utah cases that the Utah Supreme Court
has never squarely addressed the Commission's jurisdiction over
paging service.
3.

In the 1974 !!cbile Telephone Service of Southern Utah
—

case

-

-

—

(No. 6969) , the Commission granted a paging

-~———'—-

certificate?

however, two facts are significant with respect to that decision.
First, the application dees net appear to have been contested,
and therefore the issue of jurisdiction was not argued before the
Commission in an adversarial context. Second, the Commission made
no findings nor conclusions from which it may be inferred that
the issue of jurisdiction was ever
whatever reason, the Commission

fully considered,

and for

failed to declare that it had

jurisdiction to issue the certificate.

We conclude as a matter

of law that the Commission had no such jurisdiction, and that the
order in that case was null and void.

We further conclude that

the inclusion of paging service in any certificates issued by the
Commission, authorizing the holders to provide mobile telephone
service, was error, and that the portions of orders conferring
authority to provide paging service are null and void.
c-8
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Protestants

refer

to

the Commission's

Order

In the

Matter of the Investigation of the Practices and Operations of
Medic-Call,

a

corporation,

Harold

Jensen,

M.D.,

Professional

Exchange Answering Service and Industrial Communications Company,
Investigation Docket No. 120 (1969), in support of the proposition that this Commission has already squarely faced and decided
the issue of its jurisdiction over paging services.

However, as

we see it, the debate in that proceeding was over the question of
whether or not Medic-Call was offering its service to the public
generally, whereas, in the instant proceeding the debate is over
different questions, one of which is whether or not a paging
service is a telephone corporation within the meaning of our
statutes.

We note that in Medic-Call v. Public Service Commis-

sion, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 P.2d 258 (1970), which is the appeal of
the Commission's Order in Investigation Docket No. 120, the Court
in its opinion merely assumes arguendo that a paging service is a
telephone corporation:

here we cannot so assume.

It is also worthwhile to note the rather stinging dicta of
the Court in Medic-Call;
"The service (paging service) is comparable to that which would be rendered by
runners or call boys to notify doctors that
they were wanted on the phone. One wonders
just how the defendant would go about regulating the service even if it had the power
to do so. If defendants can regulate the
service rendered by plaintiffs herein, could
they not with equal propriety regulate the
semaphore signaling of the Boy Scouts or the
smoke signals of the Indians on a hunting
expedition?" (at page 260, 470 P.2d)

C-9
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cite

the

opinion

of

the

Supreme

Court

Williams v. Hvrun Gibbons & Sens Co., 602 P.2d 684

in

(1979), to

demonstrate that the term "telephone line" includes the plant,
equipment and facilities used to provide paging

services.

In

Williams the Court construed the meaning of ntelephone line" but
did so by stating only that the phrase included "radio-telephone
communications."

The Williams case presented the issue to the

Court in the context of an eminent domain proceeding, and the
question of whether plaintiff had condemnation powers required a
finding that the plaintiff was in fact a public utility.
business

of

the plaintiff

for which

eminent

domain

The

had been

sought was to install a transmitter to operate radio telephone
and paging service.

The Court didn't specify that paging is to

be treated within the definition of a "telephone line" but relied
mere generally
within

on

the broad

"radio-telephone
definition

mission wires") without
radio-telephone

communications"

as

("whether with or without

identifying

communications.

services which

Clearly,

mobile

failing
trans-

constitute
telephone

service is within the meaning of the statute, and the case can be
said to stand for that; however, we conclude that the nature of
pacing service is so fundamentally distinct and different from
mobile telephone service that the Court1s language in that case
falls short of declaring paging to be a telephone line.
We read the fleeting references to paging service in the
cases to mean that paging has been a distinctly separate service
which

companies

have

offered

adjunctively

C-10

to

their

customers
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- 11 because

the

service

can

technologically

dovetail

with

mobile

telephone service? but the two are not the sane in fact, nor
should they be treated the same in law.
5.

The distinction between paging and telephone service is

critical because if in defining "telephone line" one focuses on
the phrase

"facilitate

telephone communication,"

the scope of

potentially regulated services becomes staggering.

Conceivably

the Commission should then regulate all suppliers of telephone
equipment,
suppliers

e.g.
of

Radio

wiring

directories, including

Shack,

Sears,

components?

all

J.C.Penney,
suppliers

the many not affiliated

Panasonic-

of

telephone

with

the Bell

system? telephone answering services, telephone answering devices
and all such suppliers? radio talk stations? newspaper classified
advertising, jad absurdum.

The focus instead should be on the

connotation of telepnone service which implies interactive, and
at least potentially extended two-way communication.

That was

certainly the focus in 1917 when the statute was enacted, since
most

of

the

services

foreseen at that tine.

new

technologically

feasible

were

not

Paging service is conceptually no differ-

ent from answering services

(which have never been considered

appropriate objects of state regulation)? it is the same service
offered through a different medium.

Telephone service over land

lines or radio waves is fundamentally the sane service irrespective

of the means of transmission.

But telephone service is a

-two-way service? paging service is one-way call notification.

c-11

CASE NO. 83-082-01
- 12 6.

Finally, we consider it appropriate to evaluate paging

service in the context of the traditional characteristics which
have warranted granting of a state-regulated
ically,

legislatures have narrowly

monopoly.

circumscribed

Histor-

the conditions

which justify such a departure from a free market economy.
conditions
which

have

generally

included

is deemed

necessary

and

the

providing

essential

existence of natural monopolies

because

of

a

Those
service

to the citizenry, the
of

significant

capital

investment necessary to achieve economies of scale in production,
and the efficient use of minimally intrusive rights of way across
land.

An objective

analysis of paging

service persuades us to

conclude the following:
(a)
growing
the

Pacing
number

effect

is

a

valuable

of pecple.

that

it

has

ers.

Industrial

the

subscribers, bur presently

convenience

capacity

for

a

small

but

presented

information to

to

200,000

serve

serves approximately

2,500

paging

subscrib-

While pacing is beneficial and efficient in aiding instant

response to telephone calls, we cannot say that the service is a
necessary
natural

public

gas

and

service
basic

in the sense

telephone

that water, electricity,

service

are

necessary

to the

well-being of the citizenry, nor can it be said that a significant

number

of

telephone

customers

avail

themselves

of

the

service.
(b)

The capital necessary to provide paging service is net

subct^niJj*T

compared

utility services.

to the capital commitments

common to other

wriwi-

..* v/ •

OJ—

;Ot-Jl
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The

public

is

not

inconvenienced

by

the

plant

or

transmission of paging signals in the way it would* be inconvenienced

by

unlimited

electric

companies

seeking

transmission

rights of way. ^ Whether there are three or three hundred paging
companies, the intrusion upon land would be minimal.
(d)

Paging may have been a service in short supply because

the FCC imposed

severe limits to market entry by restricting

frequencies within the RF spectrum; however, the FCC decision to
release

96

new

frequencies

significantly

alters

the

supply

consideration and represents a major federal policy to liberalize
market access and foster competition in the paging industry.
(e)

If competition can produce service and price benefits

to paging customersr

there would appear to be no substantial

reason for this Commission to exercise jurisdiction.

Certainly

there would be obvious advantages to the Protestants if marker
entry were restricted, but the purpose of state regulation isn't
to protect the interests of regulated companies for their own
sake; it is to protect the public interest.

Conceivably, there

will be many market entrants, and it is likely that seme will
flourish and some will fail.

We see no significant risk to the

public if some providers fail, and we are persuaded that the open
market will in time be the best safeguard of the public interest,
both in terms of price and service.
(f)

The Protestants urge the Commission to assert jurisdic-

tion to preclude duplication of facilities, but duplication is
the essence of competition, and such a policy would be rational
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- 14 only if the investment necessary to launch a paging service were
vastly greater than it is.
7.

The

issues

raised

herein

demonstrate

that

it

is an

appropriate time to request that our Legislature modernize the
definition of telephone service.

The questions in this case, as

well as the the Commission's decision to assert limited regulatory oversight of WATS

resellers, and the restructuring

of the

telephone industry incident to the break-up of the Bell System
merit a careful evaluation of what ought to be regulated and what
cannot be regulated in order to better serve the communication
requirements of Utahns.

We are attempting to crunch the tech-—

nology of 1983 into the terminology of 1917, and there are too f
many technological and economic developments to make ambiguous j
f

definitions advisable or workable.
Accordingly, we make the following Order:
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the application
of Page America of Utah, Inc. be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Telephone,
insofar

Inc., Certificate
as

the

same

No.

purports

1414
to

issued
grant

in Case

authority

service be, and the same hereby is, hereby amended

No. 5169,
for

paging

to delete

therefrom any reference to paging service, and that a copy of
this Order be filed and made effective in said case; and
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- 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity No. 1504 issued in Case No. 5482 to David R. Williams,
dba

Industrial

amended

to

Communications,

delete

therefrom

be,

any

and

the

reference

same
to

hereby

mobile

is,

paging

service; and that a copy of this Order be filed and made effective in said case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Telephone Service of Southern Utah Inc., Certificate No. 1856 issued
in Case No. 6969, insofar as the same grants authority for paging
service, is hereby voided, and that a copy of this Order be filed
and made effective in said case.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 28th day of November,
1983.

/s/ A. Robert Thurman,
Administrative Law Judge
Approved and confirmed this 28th day of November, 1982f as
the Report and Order of the Commission.
I si
(SEAL)

Brent H. Cameron, Chairman

I si David R. Irvine, Commissioner
I si James M. Byrne, Commissioner

Attest:
Isl

Georcia E. Peterson, Secretarv
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WILLIAMS v. PUBLIC SI fcVICE COMTs' OF UTAH
CiteM720P.2d

David R. WILLIAMS, dba Industrial
Communications, Petitioner,
v.
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chairman; David R. Irvine, Commissioner,
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Respondents.
MOBILE TELEPHONE, INC., a
corporation, Petitioner,
v.
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chairman, David R. Irvine, Commissioner,
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Respondents.
Nos. 19867, 19873.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 4, 1986.
Appeal was taken from order of the
Public Service Commission holding that
Commission had no authority to regulate
one-way mobile telephone paging services.
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held
that Public Service Commission's decision
that no certificate of public convenience
and necessity was necessary to operate
one-way mobile telephone paging service,
announced in letter to prospective operator,
was a "rule" within meaning of Administrative Rule Making Act so that Commission was required to follow Act's procedural requirements.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Telecommunications e»461
Public Service Commission's decision
that no certificate of public convenience
and necessity was necessary to operate
one-way mobile telephone paging service,
announced in letter to prospective operator,
was a "rule" within meaning of Administrative Rule Making Act [U.C.A.1953, 6&46-3(4) (Repealed)], so that Commission
was required to follow Act's procedural

D-l
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requirements. U.C.A.1953, 54-1-1 et seq.,
54-1-1.6, 54-7-1.5, 54-7-13, 63-46a-l et
seq., 63-46a-2(8), 63-46a-3(3)(a), 63-46a-4;
U.CA.1953, 63-46-1, 6^-46-3(4), 63-46-5
(Repealed); Const Art 1, § 7; U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14.
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Telecommunications e=>461
Commissioners on Public Service Commission who had participated in decision
that no certificate of public convenience
was required to operate one-way mobile
telephone paging service, announced in letter to prospective operator, would not be
precluded from considering the jurisdictional matter on remand on basis that they had
violated statutory prohibitions against ex
parte communications, where prospective
operator was not party to any proceeding
pending before Commission at time letter
was issued. U.C.A.1953, 54-7-1.5.

Keith E. Taylor, F. Robert Reeder, Michael L. Larsen, Brinton R. Burbidge, Salt
Lake City, for petitioner.
David L. Stott, Stuart L Poelman, Salt
Lake City, for intervenor Amer. Paging.
Stephen R. Randle, Salt Lake City, for
Page Amer.
David L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Craig
Rich, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
respondents.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Petitioners Industrial Communications
and Mobile Telephone, Inc., appeal from an
order of the Utah Public Service Commission ("Commission,f) holding that the Commission has no authority to regulate oneway mobile telephone paging services. Petitioners allege, inter alia, that the Commission did not follow proper administrative procedures in concluding that it lacked
jurisdiction. We agree that the Commission fafled to adhere to proper requirements in ruling on the jurisdictional issue,
and accordingly reverse and remand for a
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new hearing that comports with the applicable statutes.
• Understanding the history of the Commission's assertion of regulatory authority
over one-way paging services is important
to this case. In 1962, the Commission
granted a certificate of public convenience
and necessity to operate both a two-way
mobile telephone system and a one-way
paging service to petitioner Mobile Telephone, Inc. By this action, and without
objection from any party, the Commission
assumed jurisdiction over both one-way
paging and two-way mobile telephone services under sections 54-2-1(21), (22), and
(30) of the Code.1 Between 1962 and 1983
the Commission granted similar dual authority certificates to three other companies. In 1974, the Commission granted to
Mobile Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc., a
single authority certificate covering only
one-way paging service. From the record,
it appears that the Commission has, on
occasion, denied requests for certificates
for one-way paging authority. Until 1983,
however, the Commission's authority to
regulate one-way paging services was not
questioned.
In the early 1980's, the Federal Communications Commission deregulated radio
frequencies for use in paging services.
Sixty-nine channels were made available in
1. U.C.A.. 1953, § 54-2-1(30) (Rcpl. Vol. 6A,
1974), states in part: The term 'public utility'
includes every ... telephone corporation ...
where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to the public generally
"
Subsection (22) states:
The term "telephone corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees and receivers or trustees appointed
by any court whatsoever, owning, controlling,
operating or managing any telephone line for
public service within this state.
Subsection (21) states:
The term -telephone line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments
and appliances, and all other real estate and
fixtures and personal property owned, controlled, operated or managed in connection
with or to facilitate communication by telephone whether such communication is had
with or without the use of transmission wires.
Z See 47 C.F.R. 22.501(a)(1) and (4), (d) and
(p)(l) (1983).
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Utah on a first-come, first-served basis.*
Page America, Inc., American Paging, Inc.,
and United Paging Corporation each received a permit from the Federal Communications Commission to operate on one of
the new frequencies early in 1983.3 In
May of 1983, American Paging's attorney
contacted Commissioner Irvine to inquire
whether American Paging could operate a
one-way paging system without a certificate. At the request of this attorney, Commissioner Irvine discussed the issue with
the other commissioners. Thereafter, the
Commission sent a letter to the attorney
for American Paging, dated June 3, 1983,
stating that in the Commission's opinion, no
certificate was required. It added that the
Commission would not request a hearing
on the issue.4 That letter is the basis of
the controversy here.
In August of 1983, Page America applied
for a certificate to operate a paging service; petitioner Industrial Communications
protested the application. The Commission
scheduled a public hearing on the application for December of 1983, indicating its
desire to "review" its jurisdiction over oneway paging services. Page America later
moved for a determination that it was exempt from regulation. The Commission
scheduled a hearing on that motion for
November 7th.
3. After receiving its permit from the FCC, United Paging Corporation applied to the Commission for a certificate of convenience and necessity, which application was pending at the time
of the Commission's hearing now under review.
United Paging did not take part in that hearing
and its present status is not apparent from the
record.
4. The letter read in pertinent part:
Inasmuch as American Paging of Utah is proposing to offer only one-way paging service,
rather than telephone service as defined in the
Utah Code, it does not appear necessary for
your client to file an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity. As
a matter of policy the Commission does not
construe its jurisdiction on an informal basis,
but deems the statute sufficiently clear on its
fact that it would not, on its own motion,
require a hearing with respect to your proposed operation.
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Meanwhile, American Paging had begun
operations without a certificate in reliance
'on the Commission's June letter declining
to exercise jurisdiction. Industrial Communications therefore asked the Commission
to issue a cease and desist order to stop
American Paging from operating without a
certificate. A hearing on the cease and
desist request was held October 24, 1983.
At that hearing, the Commission admitted
it was in a dilemma inasmuch as it had
"contradicted itself somewhat by the issuance of the June 3rd, 1983 letter." The
Commission refused to order American
Paging to stop operations; however, it ordered American Paging not to accept new
customers until after the November hearing on Page America's certificate at which
the jurisdictional issue would be reviewed.
Following the November hearing, the
Commission formally ruled that it had no
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging services, effectively deregulating that field.
The Commission dismissed Page America's
application for a certificate and cancelled
the certificates of Industrial Communications and Mobile Telephone, Inc., to the
extent they authorized one-way paging services. It also cancelled the certificate
granted to Mobile Telephone of Southern
Utah, Inc., authorizing the operation of a
one-way paging system.5
After the ruling, Industrial Communications, which had opposed deregulation,
sought a reversal of the Commission's order and a disclosure of ex parte communications relating to the jurisdictional issue.
It also moved for a rehearing before a
commission pro tempore, claiming that by
virtue of the June letter to American Paging, the Commission had prejudged the jur5. Two companies not participating in the hearing still hold certificates of convenience and
necessity for one-way paging services.
6. Section 54-1-1.6 of the Code, enacted in 1983
(1983 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 5), provides for a
commissioner pro tempore to be appointed by
the governor when a commissioner is "temporarily dismissed or disqualified.'' Commissioners pro tern shall have the qualifications required for public service commissioners.
7. The Utah Rule Making Act was repealed and
' replaced in its entirety after the facts giving rise
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isdictional issues.* The Commission acknowledged the June letter and the contacts leading up to it, but refused to set
aside its order for any reason. On appeal,
Industrial Communications and Mobile
Telephone, Inc., challenge the Commission's actions.
The principal procedural point raised by
petitioners is that the Commission's June
letter effectively operated to relinquish the
Commission's jurisdiction over oneway
paging, and stripped petitioners and their
similarly situated competitors of a valuable
property right—their certificates. Petitioners argue that under the provisions of the
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, the
hearing provisions of the Public Service
Commission Act, and the due process clauses of state and federal constitutions, the
June letter constituted a de facto rule making which required that all interested parties be given proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. See U.C.A., 1953, § 6346-5 (2nd Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978); U.C.A.,
1953, § 54-7-13 (Repl. Vol 6A, 1974); Utah
Const art I, § 7; and U.S. Const amend.
XIV.
[1] We first inquire whether the Commission's actions complied with the procedural requirements of the statutes governing agency rule making or agency adjudication. Any state agency promulgating a
rule must follow the procedures specified
in that act U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46-1 (2nd
Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978).7 A rule is defined as
a "statement of general applicability . . .
that implements or interprets the law or
prescribes the policy of the agency in the
administration of its functions
"
U.CA., 1953, § 63-46-3(4) (2nd Repl. Vol
to this action occurred. Our conclusion would
not be any different were we to analyze this
case under the new statute. 1985 Utah Laws ch.
158, § 2. The statute now requires rule making
whenever "agency actions affect a class of persons" and defines a rule as "a statement made
by an agency that applies to a general class of
persons ... [which] implements or interprets
policy made by statute
" U.CJL, 1953,
§ 63-46a-3(3Xa). -2(8) (2nd Repl. VoL 7A. 1978
and Supp.1985).

776

Utah

720 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

7A, 1978). The Public Utilities Act, also
relied on by petitioners, requires that the
Commission give notice and hold a hearing
before it alters, amends, or rescinds an
order or decision. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-7-13
(Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974). Petitioners claim
that the procedural requirements of at
least one of these statutes apply here because the June letter constituted either a
"rule" within the meaning of the Rule Making Act, or an "order" within the meaning
of the Public Utilities Act.
The Commission argues that the June,
1983, letter was not a rule making within
the meaning of the Utah Rule Making Act
because it did not have general applicability. The Commission also argues that because it had never formally determined
that it had jurisdiction to regulate paging
services under the Public Utilities Act, it
was free to announce its opinion on the
subject without any procedural formalities.
There is no merit to the Commission's arguments.
As an initial matter, we note that the
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act
seems most directly on point here. It deals
in some specificity with matters that the
Public Utilities Act covers only inferentially, and the Rule Making Act's provisions do
not appear inconsistent with the earlier enacted utility statute.
The pivotal question is whether the decision announced by the Commission in the
June letter amounted to a rule. It might
be argued that the Commission's action
here is merely legitimate law development
through adjudication as opposed to rule
making. We acknowledge that there is a
variance oi opinion on when an agency is
engaged in rule making and must follow
formal rule making procedures, and when
an agency may legitimately proceed by
way of adjudication. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 89 S.Ct
1426, 22 L.Ed.2d 709 (1969); and NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct
1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). However, we
think that there are some fundamental

points of reference in this area of the law
that are of assistance in determining
whether the Commission should have proceeded by formal rule making. Professor
Davis summarized some of these considerations.
Although a retroactive clarification of
uncertain law may be brought about
through adjudication, according to [SEC
v. Cheney Corp., 332 U.S. 194 [67 S.Ct
1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1347) ] and its many
progency . . . , the'problem may be different when an agency through adjudication
makes a change in clear law, as when it
overrules a batch of its own decisions,
especially if private parties have acted in
reliance on the overruled decisions.
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§ 7:25, at 122 (2d ed. 1978). Interpreting
the definition oi "rule" contained in section
63-46-3(4), in light of these considerations,
leads us to the conclusion that the Commission was engaged in rule making and had
to follow the requirements of the Utah
.Administrative Rule Making Act 8
First, the Commission's decision was
generally applicable: by deregulating the
one-way paging market and permitting
open competition in the market, the decision altered the rights of all certificate
holders, despite their explicit reliance on
the Commission's prior iroterpretation. Second, the letter interpreted the scope of the
Commission's statutory regulatory powers,
thus "interpreting] the law," within the
meaning of the Rule Making Act Moreover, in so acting the Commission, in the
words of Professor Davis, made a "change
in clear law." For over twenty years, the
Gws*n*is&\ofc Vvas interpreted its authonty
over telephone corporations to include oneway paging services. It has required certificate holders to file tariffs and pay public
utility sales taxes. It has denied some
requests for certificates. In one case, it
issued a certificate that covered only oneway paging. In Medic-Call, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470
p.2d 258 (1970), the Commission even went

8. For these reasons, section 54-7-1.5, governing
the functions of the Commission when entering
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an order, has no application to the June letter
or the proceedings leading up to its issuance.
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to court to defend its' jurisdiction over paging services.9
Under all these circumstances, we conclude that the Commission cannot reverse
its long-settled position regarding the scope
of its jurisdiction and announce a fundamental policy change without following the
requirements of the Utah Administrative
Rule Making Act. See, e.g., Ford Motor
Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.1981),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 999, 103 S.Ct 368, 74
L.Ed.2d 394 (1982); see also 2 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 7:25, at
125 (2d ed.1978). These requirements were
not met. Nonparties were not given notice
of the Commission's intention to reconsider
its long-held position in connection with the
June letter. And the November adjudicative hearing certainly cannot be considered
an adequate substitute for a rule making
proceeding. Many of the protections provided for by the Act were missing from
that proceeding, including adequate advance notices to all affected parties, an
opportunity to participate, and an opportunity to comment on the proposed rule.
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46a-4 (2d Repl. Vol. 7A,
1978, Supp.1985). Because the requirements of the Act were not satisfied, the
rule is vacated and the matter is remanded
for further proceedings.
[2] The next issue is whether the current commissioners should be precluded
from considering the jurisdictional matter
on remand. Petitioners contend that the
commissioners who participated in the decision announced in the June letter had prejudged the jurisdictional issue. Therefore,
they request that we order the recusal of
all the commissioners and the appointment
of a commission pro tempore.
Petitioners assert that recusal is necessary because the opinion announced in the
June letter violated the statutory prohibitions against ex parte communication
about matters pending before the Commission. Section 54-7-1.5 provides in part:

No member of the public service commission . . . shall make or knowingly cause
to be made to any party any communication relevant to the merits of any matter
under adjudication unless notice and an
opportunity to be heard are afforded to
all parties. No party shall make or
knowingly cause to be made to any member of the commission . . . an ex parte
communication relevant to the merits of
any matter under adjudication.
There are several problems with petitioners' argument. By its terms the statute
does not apply to dealings between the
Commission and American Paging. In
May and June of 1983, American Paging
was not a party to any proceeding pending
before the Commission that involved the
question of the Commission's jurisdiction
over one-way paging services. Moreover,
the letter was not an adjudication but, in
substance, a rule making, as we have noted
above. Therefore, any dealings between
American Paging and the commissioners
could not be a communication between a
"party" and a member of the Commission
"relevant to the merits" of "any matter
under adjudication." Second, section 54-71.5 was not effective until July 1, 1983,
almost a month after the letter was written. See 1983 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 15.
It is true that the later proceedings before the Commission on the application of
Page America for a certificate should be
classified as an "adjudication" within the
meaning of section 54-7-1.5, and that these
proceedings occurred after the effective
date of the statute. However, that does
not change the.nature of the May and June
communications between the Commission
and American Paging nor the fact that the
statute, by its terms, does not apply to
them.
Because the jurisdictional issue likely
will be resolved by a rule making proceeding on remand and will obviate the need for
further proceedings, we need not further

9. This Court ruled in Medic-Call that the PSC
could have no jurisdiction over a private nonprofit paging service because it was not a public
utility. We did not reach the issue of whether a
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publicly available paging service, such as petitioners here operate, would be a public utility
because our holding was limited to the private
nature of the arrangements before us.
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consider whether and under what circumstances recusal may be required in administrative adjudications when the specific provisions of section 54-7-1.5 do not apply.
Plainly, having participated in a rule making proceeding does not automatically preclude a commissioner from participating in
a later, properly conducted adjudication.
We have considered the other issues
raised and find their disposition unnecessary to the result. The Commission's rule
is of no force and effect, and its order is
vacated. The matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

whose vehicles are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble, and (2) driver's refusal to submit to breath test upon
rumors that tiiere had been incidents of
tampering with breathalyzer in the past
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting defendant to license revocation.
Affirmed.
1. Automobiles «=»144.2(9)
In revocation proceeding, Driver Division has burden to show that operator of
vehicle was in actual physical control of
motor vehicle and that arresting officer
had grounds to believe that operator was
under influence of alcohol.
2. Automobiles «=»144.2(10)
In trial de novo, district court must
determine by preponderance of evidence
whether driver's license was subject to revocation for driving under the influence of
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10.

Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Driver
License Services, Utah Department of
Public Safety, Defendant and Respondent
No. 20112.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 12, 1986.
Utah State Driver License Division revoked driving privileges of driver for period of one year. The Seventh District
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. Davidson, J., affirmed the administrative decision. Driver appealed. The Supreme
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
and/or drugs was intended by legislature
to protect public safety and apprehend
drunken driver before he or she strikes and
may not be construed to exclude those

3. Automobiles *=>144.2(3)
Supreme Court's review of district
court's determination as to whether driver's license was subject to revocation for
driving while under the influence of alcohol
is deferential to trial court's view of evidence unless trial court has misapplied
principles of law or its findings are clearly
against weight of evidence.
4. Automobiles *=>144.1(1)
Even if truck was inoperable at time
that licensee was found sleeping in it and
arrested, that would not preclude him from
having "actual physical control" over truck
so that his driver's license could be revoked
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alcohol content U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2).
5. Automobiles *»349
Statute providing for arrest of one "in
actual physical control" of vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs
was intended by legislature to protect public safety and apprehend drunken driver
before he or she strikes and may not be
construed to exclude those vehicles are
presently immobile because of mechanical
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID R. WILLIAMS d/b/a
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS,
ORDER AND
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
AMERICAN PAGING, INC. OF
UTAH, a corporation,
Defendant.
MOEILE TELEPHONE, INC., a
corporation,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. C86-1903
(Judge Hanson)

vs.
AMERICAN PAGING, INC., a
corporation,
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Clarification,
Certification, Stay of ProceedinaJB^and_Protective Order
came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled
Court on September 2, 19B6, and the following is acknowledged;

F.-1

1.

Keith E. Taylor appeared on behalf of plaintiff

David R. Williams, Kay M. Lewis appeared on behalf of plaintiff Mobile Telephone, Inc., and Stuart L. Poelman appeared
on behalf of defendant American Paging, Inc. of Utah.
2.

The Court heard the respective arguments of counsel

and has reviewed the pleadings and memoranda filed herein.
3.

Defendant American Paging, Inc. of Utah had pre-

viously filed its Motion to Dismiss and plaintiffs had previously filed their Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.
Said motions were argued to the Court by both written memoranda and orcil argument presented on June 23, 1966. On
August 12, 1966, the Court entered its Order Denying Defendantfs Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Plaintiffs1
Motions for Partial Summarv Judcmert and a Declaratorv
-

^

Judgment.
4.

The parties have stipulated that the Court's Order

Denying Defendant* s Motion for Sumr.ary Judgment and Granting
Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment entered
August 12, 1986, and any Declaratory Judgment entered in
connection therewith should be vacated.
5.

Based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v.

Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773, the Court finds that
the providing of one-way paging service to the general public
in the State of Utah constitutes the services of a "public

E-2-

utility/1 which is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction
of the Utah Public Service Commission.
6.

The Court finds that defendant's Motion to Dismiss

and plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment should
be denied in all respects, except for the Declaratory Judgment set forth herein.
7.

The Court finds that consideration of the questions

raised concerning a stay of this action pending appeal and
a protective order covering further discovery should be
continued for determination at a later time.
8.

The Court finds and the parties agree that this

Order and Declaratory Judgment should be certified by the
Court as a final judgment under the provisions of Rule 54(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that a separate certification thereof should be entered.
NOW, THEREFORE, BASED UPON THE FOREGOING AND GOOD CAUSE
APPEARING THEREFOR, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment and Granting Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment entered August 12, 1986, and any Declaratory
Judgment entered in connection therewith be and the same are
hereby vacated;
2.

It is declared that the providing of one-way paging

service to the general public constitutes the service of a
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••public utility" which is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Utah Public Service Commission;
3.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and plaintiffs1

Motions for Partial Summary Judgment are denied except as
to the Declaratory Judgment set forth in the next proceeding
paragraph.
4.

Consideration of a stay of this action pending

appeal and of a protective order covering any further discovery herein is continued;
5.

Defendant's request for certification under Rule 54(b)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is gramted and is contained in the Court's Certification for/appeal entered herewith,
DATED this

/0

day of September, 1986.

/Timothy R. Hanson
'District Judge
..
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t. SHORT TITLE OF RULE

Commission jurisdiction over one-way paging services
l

BRIEF SUMMARY OF RULE OR CHANGE AND REASON FOR IT

The Public Service Commission of Utah does not have jurisdiction
over one-way paging services. The reason for the rule is thfct one-way
paging service
does not fall within the definition- of a "telephone" corporation11 in that such service does not utilize a "telephone line".
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SIGNATURE OF AGENC^ MEAD OR^tJtS+GNEE

Brent H. Cameron, Chairman

DATE

PSC of Utah

IMTOfr^'^Ljis^^""^,^
' 120-OAY RULE EFFECTIVE:

TIME:.>«0p^

MEMORANDUM

APPROVED BY COMMISSIONERS:
BRENT K CAMERON " - ^ '
c
JAMES M. BYRNE
'•'•' r } _
BRIAN I STEWART - ^ T *'"*•

TO:

Brent H. Cameron
James *'. Byrne
Ted Stewart

FROM:

Joe Dunlop

DATE:

May 16, 1986

RE:

RULE ON ONE-WAY PA^INu si-.Kv: <_^,

uase No. 86-999-0*

I recommend adoption of the one-way paging rule elective today.
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In the Matter o^ +-he Applica)
tion of AMERTCAN PAGING*, INC. >
fOF UTAH) for a Certificate o^ >
Convenience and Necessity to
)
Operate as a Public Utility
)
Rendering Paging Service rto the )
General Public in Areas o Box \
Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis,
)
Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch)
and Tooele Counties, Utah.
)

CAP17: vpt 85-?007-01
ORHEP GRANTING MOTION
TO DISMISS

"SSU^D:

vav 23 , ^.986

By the Commission:
On or about August 10, i?33, Page America Inc. ^iled an
application v;ith the Commission to provide one-way paging service.

On November 28, 1983, however, the Commission ruled that

it had no statutory jurisdiction over paging services.

The case

was subsequently appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.
On or about April 30, 1985 American Paging Inc. (American Paging) filed an application with the Commission to provide
one-way paging service to the general public between points in
Box Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch
and Tooele Counties within that area.

American Paging filed

simultaneously a Motion to Dismiss its Application for the reason
that the Commission, in its Order cf November 28, 1983, had
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way
paging services.

American Paging also stated that although the

1985 Utah Legislature amended the Public Utilities Act by adding
Chapter 8b. empowering

the Commission to wholly or partially

exempt certain competitive telecommunication services or service

C^.Sr NO. 85-?0On-01
- ?providers, said chapter did not expand the Commission1s jurisdiction beyond that which it already had.
On or about March 4, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that the Commission's deregulation of one-way paging was defective

because

the

Commission

had

attempted

the

deregulation

through an Order construing its jurisdiction rather than through
rulemaking under the Administrative Rulemaking Act.
Thereafter,

in

accord

with

the

instruction

of

the

Supreme Court, the Commission filed a notice of proposed rulemaking with the Office of Administrative Rules on April 15, 1986,
which stated that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over
cj.e-way paging and the reasons for it.
the parties.

Notice was provided to

No party requested a hearing within the 15-day

period following publication as required by the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.

The rule was formally adopted and made

effective Mav 16, 1986.
The Commission further concludes from the comments and
oral arguments of the parties that Chapter 8B of the Public
Utilities Act of the Utah Code does not expand the jurisdiction
of the Commission to include one-way paging.
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will make the
following:

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Commission, having issued a rule pursuant to the Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act and in accord with the direction of the Utah
n—*)

rzyqp "p. 85-2007-01
- 3 Supreme Court that

it does not have jurisdiction over one-way

paging services and having further determined that Chapter 8B of
the Public Utilities Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the
Commission

to

include

one-way

paging, hereby

grants

American

Paging's Motion to Dismiss its Application for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity to provide one-way paging services.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23rd day of May,
1986.
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAJLIS

In the Matter o r the Application
of AMERICAN PAGING, WC. (OF Tjrz^
for a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity to Operate as a
Public Utility Rendering Paging
Sendee to the General Public in
Areas of Box Elder, Weber, Morgan,
Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Surmit,
Wasatch and rT1ooe1e Counties, Utah.
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OR^ER G^AM^IMn MOTION TO DISMTSS

Countv o^ Salt Lake )
1

S55.

S-.3*-e of Utah
Brenda Warner, be?ng du.lv sworn, deposes and says that she is a secretary regularly
employed in the office of the Public Service Ccrnission o^ Utah, whose office is
located at 160 East 300 South, fourth Floor, Heber M. Wells State Office Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
That there is a United States Post Office at Salt Lake City, and at the place of
residence or place of business of the persons whose names are set forth below; and
between Salt Lake City and residence or places of business, there is a regular
cannunication by mail.
That on the 23rd day of May, 1986, affiant served a true copy of the hereto attached
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS on the said persons by mailing such ccpy on said
date in a post office in Salt Lake City, Utah, properly enclosed in a sealed
envelope with postage prepaid thereon, legibly addressed to the following persons,
at the addresses shewn: K
* Stuart Poelinan ^jy^\r
10 Exchange Place «,\^>Ncv
P.O. Box 3000
SLC, UT 84110

Bryan L. McDougal
Judge Building, Ste 735
8 East Broadway
SLC, UT 84111

Also attached mailing list
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 23rd day of May, 1986.

My Camdssion Expires
arvK-n in IQPQ

Notary Puplic
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah

Brinton R. Burbidge
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South 300 East
SLC, UT 84111
Mobile Telephone, Inc.
c/o Max Bangerter
80 West 2100 South
SLC, UT 84110
Page America of Utah
c/o Stephen R. Randle
UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER
520 Boston Building
SLC, UT 84111
Kay M. Lewis
JENSEN & LEWIS
320 South 300 East, No. 1
SLC, UT 84111
Community Paging Corp.
P.O. Box 10
Lexington, NE
68850
Mobile Telephone Service of
Southern Utah, Inc.
c/o Max Bangerter
80 West 2100 South
SLC, UT 84115
W. L. Johnson
AT&T Communications
2600 N. Central Ave., Ste 300
Phoenix, AZ
85012
Randy L.
PARSONS,
P.O. Box
SLC, UT

Dryer
BEHLE & LATIMER
11898
84147

Patrick J. Oshie
Office of Attorney General
236 State Capitol
BUILDING MAIL
Keith E. Taylor
Industrial Communications
P.O. Box 11898
SLC, UT 84147
Gregory B. Monson
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, Ste 1200
SLC, UT 84101

Dwight M. Whitley, Jr.
NewVector Communications, I
3350 161st Avenue S.E.
P.O. Box 7329
Bellevue, WA
98008-1329

Elder News & Journal
n: Bruce Keyes
gham City, UT
84302
id Eskelsen
eret News
. Box 1257
, UT 84110
ention: Newsroom
Enterprise
. Box 11778
neer Station
, UT 84147-0778
i/, Inc.
5 South 3600 West
, UT 84119
en Standard Examiner
n: Mark Shenefelt
- 23rd Street
. Box 951
en, UT
84402
y Desk
t Lake T bune
South ifcin
, UT 84111
ited Press International
. Box 1375
84111
f UT
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Robins
East South Temple
84111
f UT
I/McGraw-Hill
y Sue White, Editor
South Franklin Turnpike
sey, NJ
07446
n F. Hart
ulatory Attorney
Sprint Communications Corp,
0 Old Bayshore, Ste 580
lingame, CA
94010
mas W. Forsgren, Esq.
h Power & Light
. Box 899
, UT 84110
01 Black, Librarian
TON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
i South Third East
_ UT

RA111

F. Robert Reeder, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
P.O. Box 11898
SLC, UT 84147

BYU Financial Services
D-148 Abraham Smoot Building
Provo, UT
84602

ElC/Intelligence
Lee Cokorinos
Government Acquisitions
48 West 38th Street
New York, NY
10018

J. Randolph MacPherson
Chief Regulatory CounselTelecommunications, DoD
Defense Communications Agency
Attn:
Code H115
Washington, DC
20305-2000

Hershel Rakes, Director
Telephone Services, UMC 37
Utah State University
Logan, UT
84322

Michael Ginsberg
Office of Attorney General
236 State Capitol
BUILDING MIAL

A, Robert Thorup, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
P.O. Box 45385
SLC, UT 84145-0385

Energy Office
355 West North Temple
3 Triad Center, Ste 450
BUILDING MAIL

Kathleen D. Zick
Department of Family & Consumer Studies
University of Utah
Steve Mecham
Salt Lake City, UT
84112
Governor's Office
203 State Capitol
BUILDING
MAIL
Olof E. Zundel
Utility Shareholders Association
of Utah
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
Bob Sugino
36 South State
Tax Commission
SLC, UT 84111
Assessed Property Division
BUILDING MAIL
Stephen Randle, Esq.
520 Boston Building
D. C. Petershagen
SLC, UT 84111
State Telecommunications Services
Rm 1226 State Office Building
Ted D. Smith, Esq.
BUILDING MAIL
Mountain Bell Legal Department
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610
SLC, UT 84111
AT&T Communications
W. L. Johnson
2600 N. Central, Ste. 300
Phoenix, AZ
85004
Geoffrey Williams
IOMEGA Corporation
1821 West 4000 South
Roy, UT
84067
Continental Telephone Company
of the West
Emmett Mays
18 East Main
Tremonton. UT
84337

